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Softening the Impact of Adjustment to Reform: The China Experience
1. Introduction
Over the last 25 years, China has undergone substantial economic reform, market integration and
trade liberalization.  The economic reforms exposed extreme distortions in China's pre-reform
economy, weighted toward capital-intensive industry at the expense of labor-intensive light
industry, and too much labor committed to the production of staple grains.  Since reforms began in
the late 1970s, China has maintained real an average GDP growth of over 8 percent annually, has
developed the world's largest light industrial sector and become a major producer of labor-intensive
horticultural products. In addition, reforms have served to establish markets, and to induce farmers
to become increasingly commercialized and participate more in non-farm employment.
This paper examines the policies used to facilitate China’s movement from a compartmentalized
and planned economy that subsidized capital-intensive industry at the expense of agriculture to a
nationally integrated market economy more fitting with China’s underlying resource endowments.
We argue that there were few losers in the process for a variety of reasons.  A primary reason is the
gradual implementation process that maintained transfers to the favored groups under the planned
economy, such as urban industrial workers, while the market-oriented economy developed
benefiting the non-favored groups, such as farmers.  This gradual process is often referred to as a
“dual-track” process as opposed to a “single-track”, or “big bang”, reform.  Moreover, in China’s
case, the reform process was more of search and discovery, rather than gradual movement toward a
specified goal.  Opportunities for farmers to benefit from the expanding economy were enhanced
by rapid economic growth and liberalizing labor market policies.  Labor, the most important
resource that farm households hold in China, was much less institutionally constrained than land
and capital during the reform period, allowing rural workers to participate in the fast growing non-
agricultural sector.
We organize the paper by first providing an overview of the China’s reforms over the last 25 years
and the changes that have taken place.  We describe the “dual-track” policies and how they served
to maintain rents for the potential “losers” from the reforms that liberalized China’s economy while
introducing markets that rationalized resource allocation and improved efficiency.  In particular, we
discuss reform of production, marketing, and trade.  In addition, we look at how the labor market
evolved to allow farmers and workers in poorer regions to participate in the rapidly expanding non-
agricultural economy concentrated in eastern and urban China.
2.0 Dual Track Reform of Production, Marketing and Trade in Rural China
Before reforms initiated in the late 1970s, rural China was segmented into roughly 24,000
communes, each meant to be a self-sufficient economic entity. There was almost no internal trade
between regions or trade between communes that were geographically close together. Most of the
"trade" that did exist was the mandated rural-urban transfer of agricultural products controlled and
managed by the central government and state agricultural product purchasing organizations. Labor
was also not allowed to move between communes even between the subgroups of communes –3
brigades.
1 The exception was on households’ "private plots", small parcels of land (usually only 5%
of all cultivated land) allocated to individual farm households to grow vegetables and other non-
grain crops. Households often exchanged the production from their private plots in either informal
or limited markets that remained in existence. Under such institutional arrangements, a majority of
farmers were in grain production and the vast majority of land was sown to grain crops.
The communal agricultural system was the rural component of an overall urban and heavy-
industry biased development strategy. After coming to power in 1949, China's government
embarked on a strategy to buildup heavy industries that were capital-intensive. At that time,
however, China had limited capital resources.  Agriculture played a key role in the pursuit of this
development strategy. Agriculture was China's main source of foreign exchange for purchasing
capital equipment from abroad. In addition, requisitioning surplus agricultural production at low
prices allowed China to deliver inexpensive food to urban areas. With artificially low food prices,
industries could pay low wages, thus increasing their profits for re-investment. The communes
made requisitioning surplus agricultural production much easier than contracting with individual
households. China's pre-reform leadership failed to recognize the poor incentives faced by rural
workers under the communes, where agricultural production was carried out in teams and there was
no linkage between output and income.
With a change in leadership cemented in 1978 came a new attitude toward economic policy where
ideology was less doctrinaire and a spirit of pragmatism was encouraged.  Reforms for urban and
the state-owned industrial sectors were politically impossible at the time.  Agricultural reforms that
could provide more food for urban and rural households, however, were feasible and became a
policy priority.  Initial reform policies included increasing prices for agricultural products (in order
to alleviate the pronounced urban-industrial bias in the pre-reform economy) and to re-establish
rural markets for farmers to sell agricultural sideline products and production from their private
plots. China’s state-owned grain bureaus carried out a price increase of 20 percent for grains in
1978, the number of rural markets doubled between 1978 and 1985, and the value of products
exchanged on open markets increased even more (Carter, Zhong and Cai, 1996).
2.1 Production Reform: Farm and Rural Non-Farm.  The most important policy adopted under the
new regime, however, was the dismantling of the communes and the allocation of agricultural land
to individual farm households under the condition that they deliver a fixed quota of grain to the
state grain bureaus. Initially encouraged as a policy to alleviate poverty in poor areas, the new
institutional arrangement, which became known as the Household Responsibility System (HRS),
rapidly took hold all over rural China. By the time it was sanctioned as acceptable for all areas (not
just poor areas) in late 1981, roughly 45 percent of the countryside had dismantled the communes
and adopted HRS (Lin, Cai and Li, 1999). By the end of 1983, 98 percent of rural households were
farming plots of land allocated to them by collective leaders.
The adoption of HRS profoundly transformed the nature of agricultural production in China. The
policy change restored rural households as the primary agricultural decision-makers and gave them
incentives to farm efficiently and effectively. Households faced "residual claimant" incentives: any
production beyond the grain quota delivery obligation was theirs to consume or sell as they saw fit.
                                                
1 Brigades were the level of organization directly below the commune; there were roughly 10 brigades in a commune.
Below brigades were production teams, with roughly 10 teams in a brigade.4
Under these incentives, households allocated less land and labor to grain production yet increased
yields more than enough to overcome the fall in sown area. Grain harvested area fell by 5.6 percent
between 79-85, but yields rose and production increased by 28 percent over the period
(FAOSTAT).  The increased yields were mostly attributed to the better incentives (both higher
prices and residual claimant incentives) that induced farm households to allocate less labor time to
grain production but the labor allocated, through care and energy, was of higher quality than under
the collective teams.
HRS, however, was a reform only at the margin while the old planning system was kept largely
intact.  Farm households were restored as the primary production units under HRS but they did not
receive full production autonomy.  The main institutional arrangement that served to maintain some
collective control over production is the unique set of land tenure practices.  Land was
“collectively” owned and village leaders allocated land to farm households for them to use, but they
did not receive full rights of alienation.  In addition, their tenure was not fully secure since they
could lose the plots of land allocated to them if village leaders decided to re-allocate land, which
happens in most villages, and frequently in some villages.  Because of their power over land
allocation, village leaders had some capacity to influence farmer’s production decisions.  This most
frequently took the form of encouraging grain production to maintain grain self-sufficiency, even
when more lucrative crops existed.  In addition, farmers received subsidized inputs, such as
fertilizers, for land in grain production, a remnant from the planned, pre-reform period.  Beyond
this, however, most village leaders left the bulk of farm production decisions up to the farm
households.
The dismantling of the communes also served to transform China’s industrial economy by initiating
a boom in labor-intensive, rural industry.  Under the self-sufficiency policies practiced by the
communes, many rural industrial shops were set up and managed by either the commune or a
brigade under the commune, referred to as commune-brigade enterprises (CBEs).  These
enterprises generally produced light industrial goods for consumption within the commune, or
occasionally intermediate inputs for nearby state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  When the communes
were disbanded, these shops fell under the de-facto ownership of the local towns and villages that
took over administrative duties from the communes and brigades, and became known as township-
village enterprises (TVEs).  TVEs did not receive the subsidies and other advantages of SOEs such
as access to credit and planned input deliveries. However, TVES had advantages the SOEs did not
have.  Unlike the SOEs, TVEs could fully operate according to the market, did not need to fulfill
plans made by the government, did not need approval from the government for hiring and firing
decision, nor for investment decisions, for many other decisions that should be made by the
enterprises themselves.  Moreover, because of the high cost of credit and low cost of labor, TVEs
adopted technologies more suited to China’s true resource endowments (Naughton, 1994).
Ultimately, the TVEs became the most dynamic part of China’s industrial economy, with
employment peaking at 135 million in 1995, up from 30 million in 1980, and producing 1/3 of
China’s industrial output, mostly in labor-intensive light industries.
The development of TVEs not only contributed to economic growth in China, but they also
represented an important institutional innovation.  TVEs were not private enterprises, they were
under a somewhat ambiguous property right regime of “collective” ownership.  The reality was that
local township and village officials held all the important property rights that are generally5
associated with ownership, including authority over management, investment and employment
decisions (Naughton, 1994). Thus, through TVEs, rural China created a unique institutional
arrangement for the property rights of enterprise assets, one that was effective and efficient enough
to undermine the economic dominance of SOEs.
For both rural land and rural enterprise assets, China developed a property right regime that fell
short of what many economists might consider to be the clear property rights thought necessary for
economic efficiency.  Both were under “collective” ownership, without explicitly defining what
“collective” really means.  The reality was that there was substantial autonomy to make production
decisions for both rural households and managers of rural industries.  In the end, these ownership
institutions were clear enough to generate a quasi-private market economy without threatening the
political interests of those opposed to private ownership and other far reaching economic reforms.
The reforms in agriculture and rural non-farm economy established in the late 1970s and early
1980s were the seeds of the dual-track policies.  The dual-track refers to maintaining a planned
economy while developing a market-oriented economy alongside.  In a nutshell, under the dual-
track policy followed in China, rents from the planned system were generally maintained, or slowly
diminished, while the market system contributed to growth and improved overall efficiency.  In
agriculture, farm households were given production autonomy, and markets were opened up for
them to sell their products.  This gave them the incentives to produce what the market demanded,
and to apply inputs according to the marginal, market returns.  But farm households were still
obligated to deliver a grain quota to the state grain bureaus at prices below the market.  This
maintained the implicit tax on agriculture that policymakers used to subsidize urban residents and
industry to facilitate industrial development.  Rural industries operated with complete autonomy
according to market principles and represented the market track in industry, while urban state-
owned industry maintained planned production.  Urban SOEs were also given some autonomy and
encouraged to compete with rural enterprises after fulfilling their planned production obligations,
but since their losses would be covered by the state and they were burdened by state-imposed
restrictions, they had less incentive or capacity to compete.
2.2 Marketing Reforms.  Despite the early success of reforms, China’s economy was far from
liberalized in the years immediately after de-collectivization.  While TVEs were growing rapidly,
SOEs still dominated industrial production, and produced largely according to a state-sanctioned
plan.  In addition, while free markets sprouted-up, the state-owned marketing companies still
dominated the market for many agricultural products.  Outside the state-owned marketing
companies, the rural economy was still very poorly integrated after years of promoting local self-
sufficiency under the communes.  There were a wide variety of transportation costs and restrictions
and the physical infrastructure to move products from one place to another was poor.
To complement the restoration of household and rural industrial production autonomy, China
carried out a series of marketing reforms.  Prior to these reforms, the state dominated all aspects of
marketing and prices, from farming inputs to outputs, and from farm gate sales to urban consumer
purchases.  Throughout the ‘80s and ‘90s, the state system was largely replaced by a system that
operates on market principles.  Important marketing reforms included policy changes in farmers'
quota delivery obligations, liberalization of marketing channels and prices, reducing consumption6
subsidies and elimination of the food ration system for urban residents and restructuring the state-
owned marketing enterprises.
The dual-track approach played a critical role in balancing the interests of those seeking the
efficiency of the market versus those beholden to the planned economy and state-controlled
marketing enterprises. On one hand, without allowing some prices to be determined by the market,
the HRS could not provide enough incentives for farmers to increase production and produce what
consumers demanded.  On the other hand, abolishing all the pre-reform marketing policies would
cause the state to lose out on the implicit taxation embodied in the system and lose control of food
prices and deliveries entirely.  The prospect of such an abrupt and complete change in state policy
was beyond the political feasibility of reform.
Under dual-track marketing reforms, farmers and industrial enterprises faced two or more prices for
the products they produced. Taking grain as an example, the primary state component was the grain
quota that, under HRS, households were obligated to deliver to the state-owned grain bureaus at
prices determined by the state, generally well below the market prices.  Beyond the grain quota,
farmers could sell additional grain to the bureaus at a “negotiated price”, which was also a price set
by the state at the beginning of the marketing year, and was generally between the quota and the
market price.  Farmers could also sell their grain on free markets, where the price was even higher,
but these sales could incur transaction costs since the markets were often well outside the village.
The pace and process of marketing reform for agricultural products varied significantly by different
products.  The general rule was that the less strategic or sensitive products, such as high-value cash
crops, underwent reform before more strategic crops such as staple food grains. At the early stage
of the reform, two-tier price systems covered all major grains, oil crops, livestock (except for
chicken), cotton, jute, other industrial materials, and even vegetable and fruit products produced
near the cities and supplied to the large cities.  However, delivery quotas for most horticultural
crops and livestock products were abandoned as early as 1985.  Quotas for grain continued to be
enforced, but the size of the quota deliveries varied year to year as marketing policies went through
periods of liberalization, followed by retrenchment.  According to Lardy, (2002), the share of
agricultural commodities sold through free markets was just 6 percent in 1978, increasing to 40
percent in 1985, 79 percent in 1995 and 83 percent in 1999.
Marketing policies in urban areas also went through a dual-track reform process.  Free markets
were setup with the reforms and state marketing channels were liberalized, but ration coupons
remained in place.  These coupons were the means by which the state subsidized urban food
consumption in order to keep industrial wages low.  By the late 1980s, urban reforms began to
bring urban incomes up and consumers began demanding better quality.  The ration coupons were
only good for purchasing grain delivered as quota, and farmers chose their lowest quality grain for
quota delivery so the quality was poor.  In addition, the state-owned marketing system was so
inefficient and margins so high that private traders could earn money by outbidding them on both
ends of the marketing chain.  Private traders regularly purchased higher quality grain from farmers
at prices higher than offered by the grain bureaus, then sold this grain in urban areas for less than
the poorer quality grain sold at the state-run stores.  Thus, urban consumers began to purchase grain
on the market and forgo the ration coupons for grain at state stores.  By 1993, urban ration coupons
were abolished entirely.7
To adapt to growing market liberalization and compete with the private sector, China’s state-owned
marketing companies were also reformed and given more autonomy.  While the grain bureaus were
still charged with collecting the grain quota deliveries, in the 1990s they were also encouraged to
engage in commercial operations on the side. Some of bureaus lost so much quota business that
they had no choice but to conduct commercial transactions in order to cover employees' wage and
other welfare benefits.  Private traders and the more autonomous state-owned grain bureaus quickly
developed a distribution system that responded to supply and demand.  However, many bureaus
were hindered from evolving into efficient commercial operations by employment obligations and
other restrictions on hiring and firing.  Much like the state-owned industrial enterprises in urban
areas, the grain bureau system was heavily over-staffed and had high payroll and other employee
benefit obligations, forcing them to rely on subsidies from the state to survive.  The fact that private
traders were undermining the commercial viability of the state-owned marketing enterprises led to
periodic crackdowns on private traders, the most notorious being the ban on private grain traders in
1997.  But such crackdowns were impossible to enforce and invariably failed.
Rural TVEs also benefited substantially from the liberalization of markets. In the early years of
reform, the TVE growth was constrained by a number of problems, the biggest of which was the
planned economy for industrial inputs.  TVEs could not always get access to important industrial
inputs that were managed by the planned economy and allocated to SOEs.  Even markets for
industrial output were underdeveloped, and TVEs often sold only to local retailers.  By the mid-
1980s, however, input markets began to liberalize and the growth of TVEs took off.  Over time,
larger regional and national markets began to take shape and TVEs could expand and take
advantage of economies of size and scale.  This, however, also led to greater competition in the
TVE sector.
Pricing and marketing reforms have led to measurable improvements in markets for even the
sensitive commodities for which reforms lagged.  Huang, et. al. (2002) show that by the late 1990s,
competitive, efficient and well-integrated domestic grain markets had emerged, despite the
interference of policies to promote local food self-sufficiency and the maintenance of state-owned
grain marketing bureaus.  The dual-track reform process also reduced the adjustment pain to the
state-owned marketing enterprises by creating opportunities for commercial activity using the state-
owned assets.  Many local bureaus began behaving like, and competing with, private traders.
Success in agricultural and non-agricultural marketing reforms has played a critical role in pushing
China toward an integrated market-oriented economy.
2.3  Trade Reforms.  China celebrated what it called an open door policy in the early years of
reform, but in reality foreign trade and investment reform came much later than the rural and
domestic market reforms.  Administrative controls dominated most agricultural trade in the 1980s,
even though some trade policy reforms took place as early as 1984-1985. At the start of the reform
in 1978, all foreign trade, both agricultural and non-agricultural, was carried out through 12 state-
owned foreign trade corporations (FTCs), which were responsible for implementing the plans made
by China’s central government. Grain exports were restricted due to the concern over domestic
food security, which was linked by policymakers to grain self-sufficiency.  Domestic state
procurement corporations in agriculture (and state enterprises that had exporting orders in
manufacturing) supplied targeted quantities to the FTCs for export. A similar mechanism was also8
used for imports. The FTCs were often not free to determine the goods that were exported and
imported or the procurement and selling prices, and thus frequently incurred export or import
losses. Losses on mandatory exports and imports were subsidized by the central government until
early 1990s.
Foreign trade reforms also exhibited the features of a dual-track approach.  Foreign trade reforms in
general involved lower trade barriers, unifying and depreciating the yuan exchange rate, and
decentralizing the trading system which included the reduction and eventual elimination of
mandatory export planning. Trade reform was mainly pushed by, and complemented, the demand
induced by dual-track reform of the domestic economy.  Examples of the dual-track trade reforms
are the two-tier exchange rate system in place before 1994, the two-tier foreign exchange retention
system, and export and import systems that embodied both plan and market components.  Taking
the export reforms as an example, under the 1984 reform, about 60 percent of exports were from
the more decentralized FTCs were still under the mandatory plan made by the central government,
while an additional 20 percent were assigned as value targets to the provinces, and the remaining
20 percent were non-plan exports.  These policy arrangements were very similar to the dual-track
policies employed in the early rural reform, i.e., fixed government quotas (in this case, export
quotas) with more market-oriented exports determined by the FTCs themselves. Also similar to the
domestic trading system, the procurement prices for the mandatory export plans were fixed and
target quantities were assigned to the producing enterprises.  However, for the non-mandatory
exports, procurement prices faced by FTCs were flexible and generally determined by market
principles.  Similar policy measures were also used for imports.  The agency system, under which
FTCs acted as import or export agents of the state-owned production enterprises, was much more
prevalent for imports than for exports.
Also similar to domestic marketing reform, the commodities that fell into mandatory import/export
categories were those that still had production quotas, such as grains, oil crops, and cotton.
Vegetables, fruits and other minor crops were the first group of agricultural products that could be
freely exported through the FTCs.  This resulted in a significant increase in exports of these
products. By grouping trade data according to factor intensity in production, one can see China's
net exports of land-intensive bulk commodities, such as grains, oilseeds, and sugar crops, have
fallen, while exports of high value and more labor-intensive commodities have risen (figure 1).
Relaxing the restrictions on both agricultural exports and imports caused more imports to enter the
country in 1980s and early 1990s, though there continued to be many year to year fluctuations for
some commodities.  These fluctuations were primarily due to policies to maintain near self-
sufficiency in important staple grains both through restricting import quotas and encouraging
domestic production.
Aside from extending more autonomy to the FTCs, China also carried out a variety of policies to
encourage trade in general, both exports and imports.  In January, 1994, China unified its exchange
rate to the prevailing swap-market rate, which led to a depreciation of the official exchange rate of
about 50 percent.  The depreciation stimulated China's exports, but the reforms to foreign currency
policy embodied in the unification also made imports easier by lowering costs associated with
getting access to foreign currency.  In addition, China systematically lowered tariff barriers on most
products, including agricultural products, throughout the 1990s.  These reforms increased the
attractiveness of China as a destination for foreign direct investment.  In turn, joint-venture9
enterprises (JVEs), particular in coastal areas, helped deepen domestic economic reform and
maintain economic growth,
2.4  Summary  The dual-track reform policies used by China to reform the planned economic
system allowed China to develop an efficient and competitive market economy while maintaining
the control and income streams embodied in the planned economy.  Establishing markets and
extending some autonomy to producers allowed producers to respond to market signals at least at
the margin.  Lau, Qian and Roland (forthcoming) show that such dual-track reforms can lead to
significant efficiency improvements.  The improved efficiency, coupled with the enhanced
incentives faced by economic agents and growing market opportunities via marketing reforms, in
turn leads to economic growth.  With growth there is opportunity for all parties to gain.  In
addition, successful economic growth helped to provide reformers with the political support
necessary to maintain, or expand, the reform agenda.  Indeed, it is doubtful that China’s leaders
sought such wide-ranging reform when the reform period began, but rather started a limited process
of reform at the margin that built upon itself as a response to its own success.
3. Reallocation of Labor: The Real Structural Adjustment
The capital-intensive industrial bias in pre-reform China was clearly evident in the labor allocation
at the time.  When reforms were initiated in the late 1970s, 80 percent of China’ workforce was
engaged in agriculture with a focus on land-intensive grain production.  Much of the remaining 20
percent was engaged in the production of capital-intensive goods in large SOEs.  Neither sector
took advantage of China’s abundant labor force to produce labor-intensive agricultural and
industrial products.  Liberalizing economic institutions created a force for a reallocation of labor
that would not only facilitate development in China, but also become a phenomenon in rural
industrial development and rural-to-urban migration of unprecedented magnitude.
At the farm household level, a profound effect of the HRS was not only gaining the autonomy to
carry-out agricultural production as they wished, but also the freedom to allocate labor to optimize
household income subject to a labor constraint.  Freed from collective constraints by the adoption
of the HRS households began making more efficient labor allocation decisions than the leaders of
the communes.  This exposed surplus labor in agriculture that could be allocated elsewhere to
increase aggregate economic output.  But at the time of the adoption of HRS, there were few
opportunities for rural labor to find employment outside of agriculture.
A primary institution that prevented rural households from participating in the wealthier urban-
industrial economy was the household registration, or hukou, system.  The hukou system registered
households as either urban or rural.
2  Workers were expected to stay in the area of their hukou
registration.  This not only meant that rural workers could not legally move to urban areas, but even
rural-to-rural migration was constrained by hukou policies.  If workers were found living in areas
other than their hukou registered area, they were technically living there without permission and
could be expelled.  Since the hukou system was primarily an instrument to prevent rural-to-urban
migration in the face of urban-biased policies, rural workers in urban areas were especially
                                                
2 Households were also registered as agricultural or non-agricultural, but most agricultural households were rural and
non-agricultural were urban.10
vulnerable to being arrested and expelled. In addition, rural migrants did not receive the services
and welfare benefits extended to urban residents, such as subsidized housing, food, education and
healthcare benefits.  There was no housing market for rural-to-urban migrants to find housing
arrangements, and even food markets were limited while urban residents received coupons for food
subsidies redeemable at state-owned stores.
Partly because of the constraints embodied in the hukou system, early opportunities for rural non-
farm employment came with the expansion of the TVEs.  TVE employment, however, also
embodied obstacles that prevented many rural workers from finding employment in them,
especially in the early years.  TVEs were managed under the authority of local officials, and
evidence suggests that many TVEs hired local worker as monopsonistic enterprises:  jobs were
doled out to village households in return for political favor or support (Chen and Rozelle, 1998).
This led to large differences in income between villages that were in close geographic proximity,
explained only by the presence of a TVE in the wealthier village (Knight and Song, 1996; Rozelle,
1994).  For workers in villages that lacked a TVE, there was little opportunity for non-farm
employment other than to migrate to an urban area or self-employment.
The system of favoritism began to break down by the early 1990s.  As competition increased, many
local officials contracted the management of TVES out to managers under a bid or other processes
that gave managers incentives to make profits, and some fully privatized.  Under these contracts,
many mangers were no longer beholden to village interests and were allowed sufficient autonomy
to make hiring and firing decisions based on productivity and profitability.  Thus, the demand for
labor in TVEs began to reflect market principles.  Many of the larger, more successful TVEs began
hiring large numbers of incoming migrants for their labor needs (Lohmar, Rozelle and Zhao, 2000).
These were often the factories where labor-intensive light industrial products were manufactured
for both domestic consumption and export markets.  Employment in TVEs peaked in 1995 with
over 135 million workers, up from only 30 million in 1980.
Regulations discouraging rural-to-urban migration were also reformed, primarily in the 1990s.
Through the 1980s, rural-to-urban migration rose, but many of these were rural workers legally
contracted by SOEs through villages and townships and were extended temporary housing and food
benefits by the SOEs.  Independent migrants were technically illegal and under the constant threat
of being arrested, jailed and returned to their home province under the hukou system.  Because they
lacked access to housing and food markets, many of the independent rural-to-urban migrants in this
period worked in the construction industry, where they could live on the construction sites while
working in the urban areas, and employers provided them with meals.
By the end of the 1980s, urban areas began to develop even faster than rural areas.  Urban
residents, given their privileged position, would not take many dangerous, low-paid and otherwise
undesirable jobs.  This, in turn, led to a demand for low wage workers that could be filled by the
large army of rural workers looking for gainful employment and happy to work for wages and in
jobs that urban residents would not accept.  In addition, suburban areas began to accept migrant
encampments in return for rental payments on the land they occupied and markets for food began to
develop as the food marketing system liberalized under the dual-track reforms.  Thus, while urban-
to-rural migration remained technically illegal, or at the very least in a legal gray area, the numbers
of rural-to-urban migrants ballooned in the early 1990s as the economies in urban China tookoff11
and liberalization made it easier for rural workers to live in urban areas.  By the mid-1990s,
estimates of the number of undocumented rural-to-urban migrants ranged from 40 to 100 million.
The whole labor market development came as a response to market forces rather than a plan to
liberalize the labor market.  While hukou policies have yet to be fully rescinded at the national
level, urban areas have come to realize the importance of migrants in their industrial development
and have reformed the institutions that discourage migration on their own.  In addition, TVEs have
become more competitive as the national economy became more integrated and they were forced to
compete with industries producing similar goods in distant regions.  This has caused TVEs to
employ workers according to market considerations rather than the monopsonistic practices of the
past.
Labor allocation today looks very different than when China’s reforms first began.  In 1978, 60
percent of formal non-agricultural workers were permanent employees in state-owned industry.  By
1994, the proportion had fallen to 26 percent (Lau, Qian and Roland, forthcoming).  In addition, by
the mid-1990s, over 10 percent of the rural workforce were engaged in informal, non-agricultural
self-employment activities (DeBrauw, et. al., 2002).  The migrant workforce had not only increased
from around 5 percent of the rural labor force in the 1980s to over 15 percent by the later 1990s,
but migrants were moving to further cities than before, indicating a more integrated national labor
market.  By the late 1990s, roughly one third of rural workers had some non-farm employment and
one half of rural household income came from non-agricultural sources.
It should be pointed out that currently there still exists a large income difference between rural and
urban areas in China, as well as between coastal and inland areas.  These facts suggest that the
labor market is still not developed sufficiently to equalize wages throughout the country.  Indeed,
limitations on migration, while far lower than before, still cause barriers between rural and urban
migration, and concentration of public investment in urban areas still exists.  Migrants also still do
not receive the full education and health benefits offered to urban households.  Coastal areas
receive by far the largest share of FDI and are far more prosperous than inland areas.  While
migration to areas in coastal China that have a high demand for labor is largely legal, enforcement
of labor laws is lacking and migrants receive few legal rights. Thus, China's labor market is far
from fully integrated and further policy adjustments, including policies related to migrated workers'
social welfare, health insurance and children education, are still facing opposition from constituents
in the receiving urban and coastal areas.
4.  Conclusion and Discussion
By all accounts, China followed a unique path toward reform.  As pointed out by Rodrik,
neoclassical economic orthodoxy would have prescribed, “the liberalization of agricultural markets
and the abolition of the state order system” in addition to “the privatization of land” to induce full
and proper incentives for China to move toward a market economy and achieve rapid economic
growth (Rodrik, 2003, page 6, his italics).  In addition, “tax reform” must be implemented to
accommodate the loss of implicit taxes from the planned grain delivery system.  A neoclassical
economist would also have advised China to implement “trade liberalization in order to ‘import’
price discipline from abroad” and “financial sector reform so that financial intermediaries are able
to assist domestic enterprises in the inevitable adjustments that are called for”.12
China did not follow these textbook recommendations, yet achieved many of the desired results.
China allowed a market to develop at the margin to serve as a guide to further reform, all the while
maintaining the vestiges of the planned economy and the rent that accrued to urban workers and
other favored sectors.  The outcome from this approach was a period of sustained economic growth
and development that is seen as an enormous success by any measure.
The success of China's reform does not imply that China's experience is the only right path for
reform. At the margin, China's success does not challenge the fundamental economic principles
guiding the reform:  establishing markets and property rights are the best way to achieve growth
and efficiency.  But China’s experience does challenge the rigid belief in the choice of the
institutional arrangements.  There is typically much uncertainty about what institutional
arrangements should be after the reform, so the process often requires search and discovery.
Different choices in institutional arrangements and policies have different costs and benefits
depending on prevailing political constraints, levels of administrative competence, and market
failure (Rodrik, 2003).
China’s experience implies that a feasible path in the reform may be more important than setting up
an ultimate goal for reform.  In addition, minimizing losers during reform was an important
principle in China's reform and has guided the reform in many respects. A reform without losers
can tremendously reduce the risk of reform and soften the objection against the reform. This
principle can be employed to determine the rank or the priorities of policy adjustments. In the case
of China, the rank of the reform priorities was not according to which reform was more important
for reaching the final goal. Instead, the policy adjustment always started from those that were
relatively weakly controlled under the older regime.
China’s experience also implies that it is important to keep a balance between policy adjustments
and maintaining economic growth. Without a respectable growth rate, it is almost impossible for
reform to be carried out without a large constituency of losers.  Moreover, gains from the reform
can quickly disappear, resulting in more and more people turning against the reform policies. The
dual-track policies not only served to maintain the flow of policy rents to the potential losers of
reform, but also kept the old system functioning while it was being replaced by the new system.
This kept China from suffering a shock that could generate resistance to reform while giving the
old system an opportunity to reform and grow itself.
While it appears that the dual-track approach has been outstandingly successful, there are
downsides to China’s reform record that may prove more difficult to overcome in the future.
Maintaining planned production and state-control of marketing has come at a cost and the cost has
been building.  As Lau, Qian and Roland show, the most pronounced inefficiency of the dual-track
reform comes from the plan track allocating production to high cost producers (or marketing
companies).
3  In agriculture, policies to encourage local grain self-sufficiency kept many
uncompetitive areas in grain production.  As TVEs began to produce superior goods than SOEs at
lower costs, the planned SOE production became surplus and this increased SOE losses.  China’s
levels of non-performing loans held by the state-owned banks are hign, estimated to be anywhere
                                                
3 Lau, Qian and Roland do not consider planned marketing, but their analysis can easily be extended to these
companies as well.13
from 20 to 60 percent of GDP.  This is the legacy of subsidizing the SOEs (including state-owned
agricultural marketing companies) as they competed with a more efficient market-oriented sector
that thrived outside of the plan and was unburdened by the restrictions placed on the SOEs.  While
these subsidies allowed the SOEs to maintain the benefit stream to the constituency of workers
favored in the pre-reform era, the costs of such policies are high.
With WTO accession and the opening of China’s financial sector as well as increased competition
from imports and more advanced domestic producers, the maintenance of these subsidies through
the state-banking system will become increasingly difficult and force more layoffs of SOE workers,
a process begun in the late 1990s, but not with the rigor sufficient to make a large dent in SOEs
subsidies.14
References
Carter, C., F. Zhong and F. Cai, 1996.  China’s Ongoing Agricultural Reform.  (San Francisco:
The 1990 Institute)
Chen, H. and S. Rozelle, 1999.  “Leaders, Managers and the Organization of Rural Industry
Management in China,” Journal of Development Economics,  V.60:  529-557
DeBrauw, A., J. Huang, S. Rozelle, L. Zhang and Y. Zhang, (2002).  “The Evolution of China’s
Rural Labor Markets During the Reforms”, Journal of Comparative Economics, V.30:  329-353
Dong Y. and Putterman, L., (1997).  “China’s State-Owned Enterprises in the First Reform Decade:
An Analysis of a Declining Monopsony”, Working Paper Number 93, William Davidson
Institute, October, 1997
Huang, J., S. Rozelle and M. Chang, (2002).  “The Nature of Distortions to Agricultural Incentives
in China and Implications of WTO Accession”, Working Paper, Center for Chinese Agricultural
Policy, Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Knight, J. and L. Song.  1995.  “Towards a Labour Market in China,” Oxford Review of Economic
Policy. v.11(4):  97-117
Lardy, N., (2002).  Integrating China into the Global Economy, Brooking Institution Press, 2002
Lau, L., Y. Qian and G. Roland (forthcoming).  “Reform Without Losers:  An Interpretation of
China’s Dual-Track Approach to Transition”, Journal of Political Economy
Lin, J., F. Cai and Z. Li, (1996).  “The Lessons of China’s Transition to a Market Economy”, Cato
Journal, V.16(2), Fall, 1996
Lin, J., (1992).  “Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in China”, The American Economic
Review, V.82(1), March, 1992.
Lohmar, B., S. Rozelle and C. Zhao, 2000.  “The Rise or Rural-to-Rural Migration in China”, Asian
Geographer, 20(1-3): 101-123, December, 2001.
Naughton, B.,  (1994).  “Chinese Institutional Innovation and Privatization from Below”, The
American Economic Review, V.88(2), May, 1994
Park, A., (2000).  “Trade Integration and the Prospects for Rural Enterprise Development in China”
Paper presented at the Workshop on China’s Integration into the International Trading System:
Issues for and Impacts on Agriculture, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, Paris, November 16-17, 2000.
Rodrik, D. (2003).  “Growth Strategies”, Working Paper, Harvard University.15
Rozelle, S., 1994.  “Rural Industrialization and Increasing Inequality:  Emerging Patterns in
China’s Reforming Economy”, Journal of Comparative Economics.  v.19:  362-39116





























millions of U.S. dollars
Labor-Intensive Crops
Land-Intensive Crops